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Showing posts with label India-Japan ties. Show all posts
Showing posts with label India-Japan ties. Show all posts

Thursday, 17 December 2015

The strange love for nuclear energy

Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Japan's Prime Minister Shinzo Abe after the signing of agreements at Hyderabad House in New Delhi. Photo: V. Sudershan

During Japanese Prime Minister Shinzô Abe’s visit to India last week, Japan and India reportedly made progress on a nuclear deal that they have been discussing for more than seven years. The governments did not actually conclude the deal: the Joint Statement released by the Prime Ministers only includes a droll phrase welcoming the “agreement reached... on the Agreement… for Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy” and expresses the hope that “this Agreement will be signed after the technical details are finalized”.

These “details” include deep concerns about India’s growing weapons arsenal within Japan’s polity that even Mr. Abe’s militaristic government has found difficult to ignore. Nevertheless, even the prospect of an India-Japan nuclear deal is worrying because it takes the country a step closer to the construction of untested and expensive reactors. Moreover, despite the Narendra Modi government’s “Make in India” rhetoric, the agreement will primarily benefit multinational corporations based in Japan.

A silent nuclear player

Although the debate on reactor imports in the past few years has largely focused on France, Russia and the United States, Japan is an important background player in this market. Except for the Russian VVER reactors at Kudankulam, in Tamil Nadu [which is the Vodo-Vodyanoi Energetichesky Reaktor or Water-Water Power Reactor and a pressurised water reactor], Japanese corporations have a key role in the three other reactor designs that the government is planning to import: the Westinghouse AP1000 reactors for Mithi Virdi (Gujarat), the General Electric (GE) Economic Simplified Boiling Water Reactors (ESBWR) for Kovvada (Andhra Pradesh), and Areva’s European Pressurised Reactors (EPRs) for Jaitapur (Maharashtra). The Japanese company, Toshiba, holds a controlling stake in Westinghouse. The ESBWR was developed by GE in collaboration with Japan’s Hitachi. Finally, the EPR is so large that Japan Steel Works is one of the few companies in the world that can forge some of its critical components. The India-Japan nuclear deal is meant to clear the way for these Japanese corporations to sell their wares in India.

Nuclear suppliers have a clear interest in this deal. A global downturn in the nuclear industry after the Fukushima disaster in 2011 has left them with serious commercial difficulties. GE, which built the Fukushima reactors, was considered a “laggard” in the industry even before its reputation was damaged by the accident. It has since struggled to find buyers for its ESBWR design, which was certified by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission only last year. Last month, Toshiba announced that from the time it acquired the company in 2006, Westinghouse had accumulated a net operating loss of $290 million. Areva is now virtually bankrupt — its rating downgraded to “junk” by Standard & Poor’s — after billions of euros in recent losses. Its reactor division may be taken over by the French state-run Électricité de France, and possibly Mitsubishi.

Need for new markets

Nor is there any scope for reactor sales within Japan. The Fukushima disaster, which has not been contained even after four years, continues to remind many Japanese of the dangers of nuclear power. A commission established by the Japanese Parliament emphasised the role of poor safety practices in the Japanese nuclear industry and went so far as to state that “this was a disaster ‘Made in Japan’”. Despite a strong push by the Abe government, nuclear power finds little support in the country. A poll conducted by a Japanese national newspaper Asahi Shimbun in 2014 found that 77 per cent of respondents supported a phase-out of nuclear power.

It is not surprising, therefore, that Japanese nuclear corporations have turned to India as a market for their technology. But there are good reasons for India to resist this sales pitch. Even with domestic Indian reactors, nuclear power has been an expensive source of electricity, but with imported reactors the costs become prohibitive. This is, in large part, due to the astronomical capital costs of reactors. Since none of the reactor designs being considered — the AP1000, the ESBWR, and the EPR — are operational anywhere in the world, cost figures must rely on projections, and these have been rising with each passing year. For example, just this month, it was reported that the total costs of the two AP1000s being built in the U.S. state of Georgia might rise to $21 billion, significantly more than the initial projection of $14 billion. Likewise, the latest estimate, from September 2015, of the cost of the EPR being built at Flamanville (France) is €10.5 billion ($11.6 billion), up from €3.2 billion.

Costly proposition

It is straightforward to translate this into a final tariff, using techniques that we described in a paper for the Economic and Political Weekly in 2013. Even accounting for a reduction in construction costs in India, a reactor that costs $11.6 billion in Europe is likely to lead to a first-year tariff of about Rs.19 per unit of electricity. For perspective, recent winning bids at auctions from coal and solar power have been in the range of Rs.4.50 to Rs.5.50 per unit of electricity.

The Indian government claims that it would reduce costs by manufacturing reactor components in India, and concomitantly promote India’s domestic manufacturing industry. However, the deal with Japan shows that this is mostly empty rhetoric. In a press briefing last year, the Joint Secretary (East Asia) explained that India’s motivation in pursuing a nuclear agreement with Japan had to do with its belief that “in the area of nuclear technology there are certain advantages which rest with Japanese industry, in large-scale forgings for example”. Of course, if key reactor components are forged in Japan, they cannot simultaneously be “made in India”.

Disaster in the making?

Another problem with the proposed reactors has to do with safety. The reactors under consideration are untested, and provide no empirical track record of safe operation. Although the industry produces some calculations, using a technique called probabilistic risk assessment to claim that these reactors are safe, these techniques are unreliable both on theoretical and empirical grounds. Indeed, given the complexity of the new designs, it is only natural to expect construction difficulties that will also impact safety. Just a few months ago, Areva announced that it had found serious flaws in the fabrication of the pressure vessel of the EPR under construction in Flamanville. The industry is itself well aware of the possibility of a devastating accident, as is clear from its constant efforts to alter India’s liability law and pre-emptively insulate itself from the consequences of a disaster.

GE’s CEO, Jeffrey Immelt, explicitly stated earlier this year that he would not invest in India without legal indemnity: “I am not going to put my company at risk... there is no project that is worth it.” One lesson that India should definitely learn from Japan has to do with the danger of giving in to such threats. More than 50 years ago, Japan succumbed to pressure from nuclear suppliers and instituted a law to indemnify them. Consequently, when the GE reactors at Fukushima suffered an accident, in part due to a design defect that had been pointed out decades earlier, GE was protected from any claims by victims. The cost of the clean-up, estimated at about $200 billion, has been borne almost entirely by Japanese taxpayers. Of course, multinational suppliers would like to institute the same outrageous arrangement in India, but there is no reason that the government should oblige them.

Citizens in both India and Japan have expressed their serious concerns about this deal and India’s nuclear imports. Recently, 13 villages near Jaitapur passed a joint resolution against that nuclear plant. Large protests have also taken place at Kovvada and Mithi Virdi. Before Mr. Abe’s visit, the mayors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki took the unusual step of jointly writing to their Prime Minister asking him to reconsider the deal with India. It is revealing that the leaders of “Asia’s largest democracies” have entirely ignored these voices on the ground, and instead moved to bail out the multinational nuclear industry.

Monday, 14 December 2015

India, Japan chart Asia’s peaceful rise

Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and Narendra Modi taking part in Ganga Aarti at the Dashashwamedh Ghat in Varanasi. Photo: Rajeev Bhatt

When the purohit at Kashi’s Dashashwamedh Ghat applied sandalwood paste and vermilion on Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s forehead, that red dot on white paste looked like Japan’s national flag. The Sanskrit chanting that accompanied the Ganga aarti after sunset symbolised a new beginning to an old friendship between India and the Land of the Rising Sun.
Standing next to him on the banks of the Ganga, Prime Minister Narendra Modi could well have recalled the words of Gurudev Rabindranath Tagore, uttered a hundred years ago in July 1916, to an audience of young students in Tokyo: “I offer, as did my ancestor rishis, my salutation to that sunrise of the East, which is destined once again to illumine the whole world.”
Old bonds, new zeal

More than two decades before Tagore paid his tribute to Japan’s cultural and civilisational attributes, an Indian engineer, Mokshagundam Visvesvaraya, visited Japan and wrote eloquently about its technological progress and the lessons Japan’s industrial development and economic rise have for India. India’s national leaders drew inspiration not just from Tagore’s poetic tributes and Visvesvaraya’s practical lessons, but equally from Japan’s victory over Russia at the beginning of the 20th century — the first Asian nation to vanquish a Western power. India was among the few countries that stood by Japan as it expressed remorse, nursed its wounds, and sought to rebuild after the Second World War.

Despite this bond between these two Asian nations, it has taken more than a decade of concerted effort to finally get both governments to commit themselves to a transformation of a “Special Strategic and Global Partnership… into a deep, broad-based and action-oriented partnership, which reflects a broad convergence of their long-term political, economic and strategic goals”. The Joint Statement issued by both Prime Ministers clears many cobwebs out of the bilateral equation, especially on contentious issues such as cooperation in the development of nuclear energy and defence capability.

If United States President George Bush had to overrule what strategic affairs guru K. Subrahmanyam famously dubbed as “the Ayatollahs of nuclear non-proliferation” in Washington, D.C., to extend to India full cooperation in the field of nuclear energy, Prime Minister Abe had to battle many post-Hiroshima ghosts and Japan’s own anti-nuclear fundamentalists (ensconced within the safety of the U.S. nuclear umbrella) to be able to extend to India a hand of cooperation in the nuclear and defence field.

Seventeen Decembers ago, and six months after India declared itself a nuclear weapon state (Pokhran-II), inviting Japanese economic sanctions, Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee deputed a team of security analysts and retired officials to reach out to counterparts in Japan, explain India’s strategic compulsions to Japanese opinion-makers, and secure an end to sanctions. In December 1998, K. Subrahmanyam led a delegation that included defence analyst Jasjit Singh, former Defence Secretary N.N. Vohra (now Governor of Jammu and Kashmir) and Ambassador Arjun Asrani, a Japanese-speaking diplomat. Realising the need to draw Japanese attention to India’s economic and business potential, and not just explain her security concerns, Mr. Subrahmanyam invited me, at the time the editor of a financial daily, to join this distinguished group.

Our challenge in using the carrot of business opportunity in India against the stick of Japanese economic sanctions was made worse by the fact that Japanese business was not only unenthusiastic about India but was in thrall of the lucrative business opportunity in China. Through the 1990s, China was the biggest recipient of both Japanese aid and investment while Japanese teams would visit India only to submit long lists of demands and complaints about how inhospitable India was to foreign investors.

The China factor

Two things made Japan wake up to the India opportunity. First, the fact that countries like South Korea began to overtake Japan in the Indian market. Second, the emergence of China as the world’s second-biggest economy, overtaking Japan. However, more than the change in the business environment in India, it is the growing challenge posed by China’s rise that has finally forced Japan to invest in India’s rise.

Over the past decade, successive Indian and Japanese leaders have been paying greater attention to the bilateral relationship, but due credit should be given to Prime Ministers Abe and Modi for taking the relationship to an altogether higher level of long-term strategic, economic and cultural engagement. The India-Japan Vision 2025 statement jointly issued by both leaders in New Delhi last week is the most comprehensive statement of long-term bilateral engagement defined by shared interests and values.

By crossing long-standing red lines in a couple of important areas, the joint statement has cut through some Gordian knots. First, the agreement on peaceful uses of nuclear energy ends years of painstaking negotiations, delayed both by the Fukushima nuclear tragedy in Japan and India’s own confused legislation of a nuclear liability law. Second, India’s decision to agree to “tied aid”, enabling Japanese funds to finance Japanese investment, especially in infrastructure and high-speed railway projects. Third, India’s willingness to promote Japanese industrial townships aimed at making India a more hospitable destination for Japanese business.

Shared strategic concerns

The 44-paragraph Joint Statement sets out a detailed framework for a privileged bilateral partnership that seeks to address a range of Japanese concerns about the security, viability and profitability of Japanese investments in India. This detailing has now been made possible because both Japan and India have come to understand the strategic importance for themselves of their bilateral partnership in a world in which China looms larger and the United States and Europe remain preoccupied with their own problems.

While Japan is a member of the U.S.-led Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and India is not, both countries are engaged in creating a Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) and Japan has agreed to support India’s case for membership of Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), even as the U.S. continues to drag its feet over this. The Joint Statement repeatedly refers to the Indo-Pacific as the shared region of strategic engagement for both powers.

There are several interesting new initiatives that Mr. Abe and Mr. Modi have signed on for. One of them is an agreement for Japanese funding of India’s own “belt-and-road” connectivity projects across Asia. While committing itself to investing in infrastructure within India to improve road and rail connectivity, Japan has also agreed to promote India’s “Act East” policy by developing and strengthening “reliable, sustainable and resilient infrastructures that augment connectivity within India and between India and other countries in the region” aimed at advancing Asian industrial networks and regional value chains with open, fair and transparent business environment in the region. Japan and India can build road and rail connectivity across the Eurasian landmass, running parallel to China’s own “One Belt, One Road” project.

All this signals a new level of partnership between Asia’s two great democracies, imparting new self-confidence to both nations at a particularly critical moment in Asia’s emerging power structure. In 1916, Gurudev Tagore ended his Tokyo speech with these words: “When Japan is in imminent peril of neglecting to realise where she is great, it is the duty of a foreigner like myself to remind her, that she has given rise to a civilisation which is perfect in its form, and has evolved a sense of sight which clearly sees truth in beauty and beauty in truth. She has achieved something which is positive and complete… Such a civilisation has the gift of immortality; for it does not offend against the laws of creation and is not assailed by all the forces of nature. I feel it is an impiety to be indifferent to its protection from the incursion of vulgarity of power.”

In 1916 Tagore had the vulgarity of European power in mind. Today, Japan and India are mindful of new centres of assertive power and have reminded each other of the immortality of their own civilisation and the potential of their partnership in ensuring Asia’s peaceful rise.

(Sanjaya Baru is Director for Geo-economics and Strategy, International Institute of Strategic Studies, and Honorary Senior Fellow, Centre for Policy Research, New Delhi.)